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Abstract
The higher rates charged by newspapers for national advertising
than fcr residential (local) advertising have been the subject of
several previous studies. Previous studies have identified some causes
for the rate differential but they have not identified all causes. The
central argument of this study is that cooperative advertising and
a companion arrangement known as "double billing" are important factors
affecting the rate differential.
Multiple regression analysis is used for the statistical tests and
the results show that Federal Trade Commission enforcement against
illegal double billing practices caused significant changes on the
newspaper rate differential; therefore, the central argument is upheld.

THE EFFECT OF DOUBLE BILLING ON
THE NEWSPAPER RATE DIFFERENTIAL
3y Waiter J. Primeaux, J: *
The higher rates charged by newspapers for national advertising
than for retail (local) advertising have been the subject of several
previous studies. Ferguson was the first to make a systematic analy-
sis. After carefully examining seven facts or conditions as possible
causes of the newspaper rate differential, he finally rejected all but
the joint product hypothesis which was found to be the only explanation
of the difference. His findings are that newspapers set lower retail
rates relative to national rates to attract local advertising which
stimulates circulation; this effect, then, attracts more national
advertising.
Simon found strong evidence that the demand for retail advertising
was higher than the demand for national advertising. His study argued
that the price discrimination explanation, previously dismissed as un-
important by Ferguson, is at least a partial explanation of the dif-
2
ference between retail and national newspaper rates.
*Professor, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. I thank
Julian Simon for encouraging me to pursue this inquiry as well as my
earlier work on this subject.
James M. Ferguson, The Advertising Rate Structure in the Daily
Newspaper Industry (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. : Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963)
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Julian L. Simon, "The Cause of the Newspaper Rate Differential:
A Subjective Demand Curve Analysis," Journal of Political Economy 73,
No. 5 (October 1965): 536.
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In a later study, I reported data which indicated that "double
3billing explained movements in the newspaper rate differential.
Bogart rejected my explanation that double billing was an important
determinant of the newspaper rate differential with the following
statement.
Explanations for the waxing and waning of the
differential since World War II might better be
sought in the communications revolution of the
period rather than in the area of illegal and
unethical practices. As television came along
in the 1950's, competition among advertising media
changed. Television, with initially high rates,
gained a steadily larger share of national budgets.
Radio lost much of its national billings and offered
comparatively lower rates because of the growing
competition among an increasing number of stations.
It became predominantly a local advertising medium,
competing more actively with newspapers for retail
business.
My earlier study only presented data showing movements of the rate
differential related to activities of the Federal Trade Commission in
its effort to eliminate double billing; however, the study did not em-
ploy rigorous statistical analysis, so the conclusions were somewhat
limited. Bogart' s criticism was similarly unsupported by any rigorous
statistical analysis and was based upon what he thought to be true
about the newspaper advertising market.
3
Walter J. Primeaux, Jr., "The Newspaper Rate Differential: Another
Element in the Explanation," Journal of Business of the University of
Chicago
, 48, No. 4 (October 1975): 492-99. Cooperative advertising and
double billing are explained in some detail later in this paper.
4
Leo Bogart, "The Newspaper Rate Differential: Another Element in
the Explanation—Comment," The Journal of Business of the University of
Chicago
, 50, No. 1, January 1977. "
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The puraoses of this additional study are: first, to examine again
the newspaper rate differential question and second, to test more rig-
orously the effects of double billing on that difference. One impor-
tant distinction between this effort and my previous work is that mul-
tiple regression analysis is used here, so the data are subjected to
more rigorous examination than in the previous research.
THE THEORY
Double billing depends upon cooperative advertising for its exis-
tence. Cooperative advertising is partly paid for by the retailer and
partly paid for by the producer of a product. Whenever double billing
is employed, media accept manufacturers' ad copy from retailers at the
(lower) retail rate (local rate) and the manufacturer is billed at the
(higher) national rate.
Such an arrangement causes the retailer to pay something
less than the percentage specified by the cooperative
advertising plan. This outcome occurs because the
retailer pays the total bill owed the medium at the
local rate and is reimbursed by the manufacturer at the
national rate. Since the national rate is usually higher
than the retail rate, the retailer reaps the benefit from
double billing."
Double billing and the cooperative advertising arrangements are
discussed in a number of references including Vertical Cooperative
Advertising Report of the Committee on Cooperative Advertising (New York:
Association oi' the National Advertisers, n.d.). This publication is not
dated but the text shows that it was published sometime immediately after
the end of WWII. Cooperative advertising allowances are also discussed
in Leverette S. Lyon, Advertising Allowances (Washington, D.C.: Brookings
Institution, 1932). The dates on the above sources show that abuses of
cooperative advertising are rather long standing institutions. For a
more up-to-date discussion see: "Lawyer's Advice: Co-op Linage Hurt by
Double Billing," Editor and Publisher (March 30, 1963), p. 123.
Prineaux, op. cit., p. 493.
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Cooperative advertising plans vary but one common arrangement is that
the retailer agrees to pay 50 percent of the cost of an aci and the
manufacturer agrees to pay the remaining 50 percent. From this discus-
sion it is clear that whenever double billing is used, the retailer pays
less than the agreed portion of the advertising charge. Large firms
with monopsony power may get much better than a 50-50 plan; so these
firms may even make profits from cooperative advertising and double
billing.
It is impossible to assess accurately the total dollar amount of
cooperative advertising within the economy; however, there are esti-
mates that it accounts for as much as 25-35 percent of store advertis-
er
ing expenditures. Obviously, any change which dramatically affects
cooperative advertising practices would have a significant impact on
both the advertising industry and the rates charged within the industry;
the FTC action to curb double billing practices was such a change.
For double billing to "work" a rate differential must exist between
the national and local rate. Local media compete with one another and
if one medium uses double billing and another does not, the one provid-
ing that option to retail advertisers will gain an edge over its
"Big Stores, Chains Are Chief Culprits in Co-op Ad Abuses Senate
Unit Told," Advertising Age (August 17, 1964), p. 75.
Q
Harold H. Bennett, "Newspapers Have a Stake: The Retailer's Case
for Co-op Ad Funds," Editor and Publisher (August 11, 1962), p. 15. In
this article, the author points out that it is doubtful whether anyone
really knows the total dollar amount of cooperative advertising. See
also "Cooperative Ad Plan Benefits Described," Editor and Publisher
(September 21, 1963), p. 22. Numerous telephone calls during the
summer of 1982 to various trade associations, as well as another thor-
ough review of trade and scholarly literature, failed to uncover the
amount of cooperative advertising within the economy. Thus, Bennett's
statement is upheld.
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competitcr. Newspapers can obviously sell more local advertising if
retailers are actually relieved of the cost of paying for ads because
9double billing is used. Consequently, advertising media have a real
stake in having a national and local advertising rate to facilitate
the double billing practice; moreover, they also have a stake in being
willing to facilitate the practice by furnishing a double bill. One
billing being for the real charge zo the retailer, at the local rate
net of quantity discounts earned by his advertising volume through the
year. A second billing being at the national rate which is higher and
really fictitious. The retailer pays the bill for the lower local
charge and sends the higher bill with the national charge in to the
manufacturer to claim his share of the cooperative advertising refund.
If the local rate is 50 percent of the national rate and if the dealer
has a 50-50 sharing agreement with the manufacturer, he would receive
advertising without cost; this would occur because his claim would be
for 50 percent of the national rate which is twice as high as the
local rate, so his proceeds would equal the amount of the real bill he
received for advertising.
In fact, the practices described above have existed over a long pe-
riod of time. Consequently, one would expect the following to be true.
First, double billing and cooperative advertising work together.
Double billing cannot exist without cooperative advertising. Second,
media which employ double billing really view the national rate as
fictitious and they are actually willing to sell advertising at the
9
Although the focus of attention here is upon double billing by news-
papers, it is important to mention that it also occurs in the other media.
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local rate. From the above discussion, one would expect that any ex-
ternal pressure on the practice of double billing would affect the
newspaper rate differential.
An extensive discussion of the role of the Federal Trade Commission
and its intense effort to eliminate abuses of cooperative advertising
and double billing can be found in my original article. Data and
references show that in 1963 a turning point occurred in FTC enforce-
ment of the Robinson-Patman Act which seriously changed advertising
plans and cooperative advertising. This change also had a profound
effect on double billing which was explicitly ruled to be illegal by
the FTC; nevertheless, the practice has not been totally eliminated.
The impact of the FTC's crackdown on double billing abuses fell most
heavily upon newspapers.
PROCEDURE
As mentioned earlier, the procedure involved the use of multiple
regression analysis to examine the variables thought to be important
in affecting the newspaper rate differential. The regression model is
based on the theory mentioned above as well as the criticism of my
earlier rate differential work by Bogart.
The ordinary least squares regression equation is in the form:
RDIF = A. + B.LNEW + B.LRAD + B.LTV + B,LCIR + B CDBILLi 1 z 3 4 5
+ B, TREND
o
10
Primeaux, op. cit., pp. 493-496.
"Co-op Advertising Dead?" Broadcasting (October 3, 1962), p. 51.
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where:
RDIF = The newspaper advertising rate differential (a percent
difference between the national and local rates)
LNEW = Log total newspaper advertising expenditures as a percent
of total advertising expenditures
LRAD = Log total radio advertising expenditures as a percent
of total advertising expenditures
LTV = Log total television advertising expenditures as a percent
of total advertising expenditures
LCIR = Log total circulation of daily newspapers (in million issues)
DBILL = A dummy variable taking a value of before 1964 and a
value of 1 thereafter
TRENT) = A time trend variable.
Data sources, raw and transformed data, and a graph of the rate dif-
ferential through time are presented in the appendix.
All monetary values are expressed as percentages so it was not
necessary to deflate the data to remove the effects of inflation.
The data consists of time series observations for 1950 through 1979
(thirty years), essentially consisting of all data since WWII.
The model incorporates the circulation variable found to be impar-
ls
tant by Ferguson and the television and radio advertising levels said
to be important by Bogart. Moreover, the DBILL variable is used to
determine the impact of more rigorous enforcement of the Robinson-Patman
Act by the Federal Trade Commission as it attempted to curb double
billing abuses; this clearly happened according to the business liter-
13
ature in 1963. This variable would capture the effects of double
billing on the newspaper rate differential.
12^
irerguson, op. cit,
13
Pnmeaux, op. cit,
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Attempts to obtain data to also provide an additional test of
Simon's results were unsuccessful.
A time trend variable was also incorporated into the model to at-
tempt to determine whether there have been any trend movements in the
differential through time.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Table 1 presents the equation developed from the model discussed
above. Statistics indicate that the equation explains 91 percent of
the movement in the newspaper rate differential, when the coefficient
of multiple determination is adjusted for degrees of freedom (and 93
percent before that adjustment). The results are quite robust with all
partial regression coefficients, except the TREND variable, statisti-
cally significant at the one percent level. The TREND variable is
significant at the five percent level. The Durbin-Watson test reveals
14
that autocorrelation did not affect the results.
The most important results from the equation is that the DBILL
variable is, indeed, important in explaining a large part of changes in
the rate differential. The results show that rigorous enforcement of
the Robinson-Patman Act provisions against double billing caused the
newspaper rate differential to decline by nearly four and one half per-
cent. This is clearly a significant impact, indicating that double
14
If the trend variable is omitted from the equation, the Durbin-
Watson statistic is adversely affected; it declines to 1.58976. How-
ever, the DBILL effect increases to -4.706. Signs on the other vari-
ables are unaffected. Because of the statistical significance of the
trend variable, as well as the effect of its removal on the Durbin-
Watson statistic, the equation in Table 1 was used.
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TABLE 1
REGRESSION EQUATION
Partial
Regression Standard
Coefficient Error Beta
-229.886 27.S54 3 -1.57419
-58.685 12.253* - .93223
-35.787 7.108 3 -1.68642
-175.075 47.406 3 - .93267
-4.404 1.193
a
-
.54432
.265 .121
b
.56722
Variable
LNEW
LRAD
LTV
LCIR
DBILL
TREND
Summary Statistic
N (degrees of freedom plus number of variables) 30
R
2
.9266
R .9075
D.W. 2.18514
Constant 145.433
F Statistic 48.417
3
Significant at 1 percent level.
Significant at 5 percent level.
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billing is in face another element in the explanation in the newspaper
rate differential. Interaction variables were also used for each
variable in the model interacting wi~th the DBILL variable. The inter-
action variables were all statistically insignificant, so they were
not included in the final equation.
The equation also shows that the newspaper rate differential is
affected by growth of advertising in the newspaper media, as well as
growth in advertising of radio and television media as asserted by
3ogart. The equation clearly shows that percentage increases in
radio and television advertising tend to cause declines in the news-
paper rate differential. This is clearly an effect of competition.
The results show that advertising share loss to other media forces a
newspaper to make rate adjustments. If the national market is threat-
ened, the newspaper will lower national rates, relative to local rates,
causing its rate differential decline. If, instead, the local market
is threatened, the newspaper will lower local rates, relative to na-
tional rates, causing the rate differential to increase. These results
are quite consistent with Bogart's suggestions mentioned earlier.
Newspapers have been subjected to intense competition from radio and
television since WWII.
The equation also shows that newspapers tended to decrease the
rate differential as their share of total advertising increased. Com-
bined with the above results, this means that if a newspaper's share
15 n .Primeaux, op. cit,
Eogart, op. cit.
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of total advertising increases , because of a relative increase In its
sales of local advertising, it is inclined to reduce the rate differ-
ential. That is, it nay be more inclined to raise its local rate rel-
ative to its national rate, thus causing the rate differential to de-
cline. All-in-ail the "media" coefficients are all consistent with
one another.
The circulation variable does not seem to support the Ferguson
joint product hypothesis. The equation shows that there is an inverse
relationship between the newspaper rate differential and total news-
paper circulation, indicating that the rate differential declines as
circulation increases. Ferguson's theory would expect a direct rela-
tionship; that is, he said that the lower the local rate the higher
circulation would be; although the direction was different in his
model, the sign on the coefficient should have been identical, if
these results would be consistent with his. Of course, Ferguson's
study was cross sectional and this one is time series; this difference
would cause some variance in results.
The beta coefficients presented in Table 1 indicate the relative
importance of the variables in the equation in affecting the rate dif-
ferential. The coefficients show that the percentage increase in TV
advertising exerted the greatest relative amount of downward pressure
on the rate differential while the DBILL variable exerted the smallest
amount. The other variables demonstrated intermediate effects. This
merely indicates that the other variables were more important than
double billing; however, it does not diminish the fact that the double
billing effects were quite significant in affecting the decline in the
rate differential.
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CONCLUSIONS
Competition from other media, as well as the relative growth of the
level of newspaper advertising, significantly affect the newspaper rate
differential but they do not provide an adequate explanation of its
existence. The need for higher "fictitious" national rates to facili-
tate the double billing process is apparently a significant factor
affecting the existence of the newspaper rate differential. Rigorous
enforcement of the Robinson-Pa tman Act to help curb double billing
abuses decreased the need for such a wide difference between the local
and national rates. This occurred because the interest in the double
18
billing practice declined after the action by the FTC began in 1963.
A more thorough discussion of the fictitious nature of the news-
paper national advertising rate when double billing is used is presented
in Primeaux, op. cit., p. 497.
18
As mentioned earlier, indications are that double billing has
declined since 1963, although it does continue to exist.
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APPENDIX
The Data and Sources
Data for total advertising expenditures, newspaper advertising
expenditures, total radio advertising, total television advertising
expenditures and total daily newspaper circulation are all from The U.S.
Statistical Abstract for the years 1949 through 1980.
The newspaper rate differential is computed by the American Associa-
tion of Advertising Agencies, Inc. It was necessary to interpolate to
obtain a few missing data points not developed by the agency. See the
attached raw data.
The BBILL dummy variable for double billing was established by
reference to business periodicals where it was determined that a turn-
ing point occurred in 1963 with respect to enforcement of Robinson-
Pa tman regulations. At that time, double billing was explicitly ruled
to be illegal, but it continues to exist. Moreover, cooperative adver-
tising plans and regulations were carefully modified by many firms when
strict enforcement took place.
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Transformed Data—Regression Analysis
(Not logged)
Newspaper Advertising TV Advertising Radio Advertising
Year Total Advertising Total Advertising Total Advertising
1950 36.36% 2.99% 10.60%
1951 35.14 5.17 9.43
1952 34.56 6.34 8.72
1953 33.87 7.76 8.05
1954 33.01 9.91 6.85
1955 33.59 11.15 5.93
1956 32.67 12.19 5.72
1957 31.84 12.27 5.99
1958 30.99 13.14 5.98
1959 31.51 13.27 5.83
1960 31.03 13.33 5.80
1961 30.59 14.28 5.77
1962 29.73 15.32 5.94
1963 29.02 15.50 6.02
1964 29.30 16.17 5.98
1965 29.22 -- .16.49 6.01
1966 29.36 16.94 6.06
1967 29.30 17.25 6.12
1968 29.05 17.82 6.56
1969 29.53 18.40 6.49
1970 29.31 18.35 6.67
1971 30.32 17.17 6.73
1972 30.18 17.82 6.63
1973 30.28 17.78 5.77
1974 29.88 18.11 6.86
1975 29.90 18.64 7.01
1976 29.39 19.93 6.91
1977 29.36 20.07 6.95
1978 28.90 20.42 6.94
1979 29.15 20.50 6.81
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